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Abstract
Economic dispatch and frequency regulation are typically viewed as fundamentally different problems in power
systems and, hence, are typically studied separately. In this paper, we frame and study a joint problem that co-
optimizes both slow timescale economic dispatch resources and fast timescale frequency regulation resources. We
show how the joint problem can be decomposed without loss of optimality into slow and fast timescale sub-problems
that have appealing interpretations as the economic dispatch and frequency regulation problems respectively. We
solve the fast timescale sub-problem using a distributed frequency control algorithm that preserves the stability of
the network during transients. We solve the slow timescale sub-problem using an efficient market mechanism that
coordinates with the fast timescale sub-problem. We investigate the performance of the decomposition on the IEEE
24-bus reliability test system.
Index Terms
Economic dispatch, frequency regulation, optimization decomposition, markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the major objectives of every Independent System Operator (ISO) is to schedule generation to meet
demand at every time instant [2]–[4]. This is a challenging task – it involves responding rapidly to supply-demand
imbalances, minimizing generation costs, and respecting operating limitations (such as ramp constraints, capacity
constraints, and line constraints). Due to the complexity of this global system operation problem, it is typically
divided into two separate problems: economic dispatch, which focuses on control of slower timescale resources
and is solved using market mechanisms, and frequency regulation, which focuses on control of faster timescale
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2resources and is solved using engineered controllers. Economic dispatch and frequency regulation are typically
studied independently of each other.
Economic dispatch operates at the timescale of 5 minutes or longer and focuses on cost efficiency. In particular,
the economic dispatch problem seeks to optimally schedule generators to minimize total generation costs. Economic
dispatch has a long history [2], [5]–[9]. It is currently implemented using a market mechanism known as supply
function bidding. In this mechanism, generators submit supply functions to the ISO which specify (as a function
of price) the quantity a generator is willing to produce. The ISO solves a centralized optimization problem (over
single or multiple time periods) to schedule generators to minimize system costs while satisfying demand and
slow timescale operating constraints (such as line constraints, capacity constraints, ramping constraints, security
constraints, etc.). Each generator is compensated at the locational marginal price (LMP) which reflect the system
cost of serving an incremental unit of demand at its node.
Frequency regulation operates at a faster timescale (from a few minutes to 30 seconds) and focuses on stability
rather than efficiency. In particular, the ISO seeks to restore the nominal frequency in the system by rescheduling
fast ramping generators. Frequency regulation has a long history [3], [10], [11]. It is currently implemented by a
mechanism known as Automatic Generation Control (AGC). In this mechanism, the ISO computes the aggregate
generation that would rebalance power within each independent control area (and hence restore nominal frequency)
and allocates the imbalance generation among generators based on the solution of the previous economic dispatch
run [2]. These allocations determine the setpoints in a distributed control algorithm that drives the power system
to a stable operating point using local information on frequency deviations. The generators are compensated at the
LMP from the previous economic dispatch run.
A. Contributions of this paper
While economic dispatch and frequency regulation each have large and active literatures; these literatures are
almost completely disparate. While there have been studies on integrating the two mechanisms more efficiently [12],
we are not aware of any rigorous analysis of whether their combination solves the global system operator’s goal
of dispatching generation resources efficiently across both timescales. The goal of this paper is to initiate such a
study.
Our main result provides an initial answer. In the context of a DC power flow model and two classes of generators
(dispatch and regulation), we show that the global system operator’s problem can be decomposed into two sub-
problems that correspond to the economic dispatch and frequency regulation timescales, without loss of optimality,
as long as the ISO is able to estimate the difference between the average LMP in the frequency regulation periods
and the LMP in the economic dispatch period (Theorem 1). This result can be viewed as a first-principles justification
for the existing separation of power systems control into economic dispatch and frequency regulation problems.
Moreover, this result provides a guide to modify the existing architecture to optimally control power systems across
timescales. In particular, using this result, we design an optimal control policy for frequency regulation and an
optimal market mechanism for economic dispatch, in a way such that the control and market mechanisms jointly
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3solve the global system operator’s problem. Our mechanims differ from existing economic dispatch and frequency
regulation mechanisms in important ways.
In the case of frequency regulation (Section IV), our mechanism has a key advantage over the AGC mechanism in
that our mechanism is efficient. The frequency regulation controller proposed in this paper is built on the distributed
controller in [13], [14] and controls generation based on information about generators’ costs in a way such that
the power system converges to an operating point that minimizes system costs. On the other hand, AGC allocates
generation based on participation factors, which might not reflect actual costs, and hence the resulting allocation
might not be efficient. In [15], the authors proposed a modification of the participation factors so that the AGC
mechanism is cost efficient. However, unlike our mechanism, the mechanism in [15] does not respect line constraints.
In the case of economic dispatch (Section V), our mechanism has a key advantage over the existing economic
dispatch operations in that it coordinates efficiently with the frequency regulation timescale. This coordination
does not require additional communication in the market beyond the existing mechanism used in practice. This
coordination involves two main components. First, our economic dispatch mechanism communicates the supply
function bids from the generators to the frequency regulation mechanism, which uses them in the distributed
controllers to allocate frequency regulation resources efficiently. In contrast, the AGC mechanism allocates frequency
regulation resources without regard to generation costs. Second, our economic dispatch mechanism accounts for the
value that economic dispatch resources provide to frequency regulation. It does so by adjusting the resource costs
in the economic dispatch objective based on the difference between the LMP in the frequency regulation periods
and that in the economic dispatch period. In contrast, the existing economic dispatch objective does not perform
this adjustment and hence might allocate economic dispatch resources inefficiently.
In practice, the ISO is unlikely to be able to estimate exactly the adjustment it should make to the economic
dispatch objective. In Section VI, we investigate numerically the sensitivity of the suboptimality of our decomposition
to those estimation errors on the IEEE 24-bus reliability test system.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Our aim is to understand how the combination of economic dispatch and frequency regulation can dispatch
generation resources efficiently across both timescales. To this end, we formulate a model of the global objective
that includes balancing supply and demand at both timescales. We use a DC power flow model and consider two
generation types – dispatch and regulation – which differ in responsiveness.
Consider a connected network consisting of a set of nodes N and a set of links L. We focus on a single economic
dispatch interval of the real-time market which is typically 5 minutes in existing markets. We partition this time
interval into K discrete periods numbered 1, . . . ,K. In general, the length of each period may range from as little
as seconds to as long as minutes. However, in this work, we focus on the case where each period is on the order
tens of seconds.
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Fig. 1: Example of a scenario tree with S = 16 outcomes over K = 5 periods. The outcomes are numbered
1, . . . , S.
A. Stochastic demand
We use a stochastic demand model motivated by the frameworks in [16]–[18]. Assume that there is a set of possible
demand outcomes S that can be described by a scenario tree (an example is given in Fig. 1). For each outcome
s ∈ S, let ds,n ∈ R denote the real power demand at node n ∈ N and ds := (ds,n, n ∈ N) ∈ RN denote the
vector of demands at all nodes. In addition, let κ(s) ∈ {1, . . . ,K} denote the period of this outcome and ps denote
the probability of this outcome conditioned on the information that the period is κ(s). Hence,
∑
{s|κ(s)=k} ps = 1
for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Without loss of generality, we assume that κ(1) = 1 and p1 = 1. That is, there exists an
outcome labeled 1 ∈ S associated with period 1 and the demand in that period is deterministic.
B. Generation
We assume that each node n ∈ N has two generators – a dispatch generator and a regulation generator – where
the regulation generator is more responsive than the dispatch generator. To model the differing responsiveness, we
assume that the dispatch generator produces at a constant level over the entire economic dispatch interval while the
regulation generator may change its production level every period after uncertain demand is realized [19]. Formally,
we assume that the dispatch generator produces qbn ∈ R in all outcomes, and the regulation generator produces
qpn ∈ R in period 1 and qpn+rps,n ∈ R in each subsequent outcome s ∈ S\{1}. Hence, qpn and rps,n can be interpreted
as the regulation generator’s setpoint and recourse respectively. To simplify notations, we define a dummy variable
rp1,n := 0 so that we may write the regulation generator’s production in period 1 as q
p
n + r
p
1,n. We assume that
the regulation and dispatch generators have capacity constraints [
¯
qpn, q¯
p
n] and [
¯
qbn, q¯
b
n] respectively, and incur costs
cpn(q
p
n + r
p
s,n) and c
b
n(q
b
n) respectively in period κ(s), where the functions c
p
n : [
¯
qpn, q¯
p
n]→R+ and cbn : [
¯
qbn, q¯
b
n]→R+
are strictly convex and continuously differentiable.
Define vectors qp :=(qpn, n ∈ N), rps :=(rps,n, n ∈ N), qb :=(qbn, n ∈ N),
¯
qp :=(
¯
qpn, n ∈ N),
¯
qb :=(
¯
qbn, n ∈ N),
q¯p :=(q¯pn, n ∈ N), q¯b :=(q¯bn, n ∈ N). Then the generation constraints in outcome s ∈ S are given by:
¯
qb ≤ qb ≤ q¯b, (1)
¯
qp ≤ qp + rps ≤ q¯p. (2)
We also let the vector rp := (rps , s ∈ S).
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5C. Network constraints
Note that qb + qp + rps − ds is the vector of nodal injections for s ∈ S. Thus, the supply-demand balance
constraint is:
1>(qb + qp + rps − ds) = 0, (3)
where 1 ∈ RN denotes the vector of all ones.
We adopt the DC power flow model for line flows. Let θs,n denote the phase angle of node n. Without loss
of generality, assign each link l an arbitrary orientation and let i(l) and j(l) denote the tail and head of the link
respectively. Let Bl denote the sensitivity of the flow with respect to changes in the phase difference θs,i(l)−θs,j(l)
and let vs,l denote its power flow. Define the vectors θs := (θs,n, n ∈ N) and vs := (vs,l, l ∈ L) and the matrix
B := diag(Bl, l ∈ L). Then, the line flows are given by vs = BC>θs where C ∈ RN×L is the incidence matrix
of the directed graph. And the injections are:
qb + qp + rps − ds = Cvs = Lθs, (4)
where L := CBC>.
Note that (3) and (4) are equivalent. For any set of injections that satisfy (3), we can always find θs that
satisfies (4). Conversely, since 1>C = 0, any injections that satisfy (4) also satisfy (3). Hence, the line flows can
be written in terms of the power injections:
vs = BC
>L†(qb + qp + rps − ds),
where L† denotes the pseudo-inverse of L. Let H := BC>L†. Let fl denote the capacity of line l and define the
vector f := (fl, l ∈ L). Then the line flow constraints are:
−f ≤ H (qb + qp + rps − ds) ≤ f . (5)
To simplify notations, we define the set Ω(ds) of feasible generation for a given demand vector ds as:
Ω(ds) :=
{
(qb,qp, rps) : (1), (2), (3), (5) holds
}
.
D. System operator’s objective
The global system operator’s objective is to allocate the dispatch and regulation generations (qb,qp, rp) to
minimize the expected cost of satisfying demand and operating constraints. This is formalized as follows.
SY STEM : min
qb,qp,rp
∑
s∈S
ps
∑
n∈N
(
cbn(q
b
n) + c
p
n(q
p
n + r
p
s,n)
)
s.t. (qb,qp, rps) ∈ Ω(ds), ∀s ∈ S,
rp1 = 0.
We assume that this optimization is feasible. Note that SY STEM differs from the existing economic dispatch
mechanism which minimize costs under the assumption that the demand during all the K periods in the economic
dispatch interval is equal to the demand d1 in period 1.
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6Let λs and (
¯
µs, µ¯s) be the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (3) and (5) respectively in SY STEM .
Then, the function pi : R× R2L+ → RN , defined by:
pi(λs,
¯
µs, µ¯s) := λs1+H
>(
¯
µs − µ¯s), (6)
gives the nodal prices in outcome s ∈ S.
III. ARCHITECTURAL DECOMPOSITION
Our main result is a decomposition of SY STEM into setpoint and recourse sub-problems. Importantly, our
decomposition identifies a rigorous connection between the setpoint and recourse sub-problems that ensures that
the combination solves SY STEM . In particular, our decomposition divides SY STEM into sub-problems ED
and FR defined by:
ED(d1) : min
qb,qp
∑
n∈N
(
Kcbn(q
b
n) +Kc
p
n(q
p
n)− δnqbn
)
s.t. (qb,qp,0) ∈ Ω(d1),
FR(qb,qp,ds) : min
rps
∑
n∈N
cpn(q
p
n + r
p
s,n)
s.t. (qb,qp, rps) ∈ Ω(ds),
where δ ∈ RN is a constant. ED(d1) is implemented in time period 1 and FR(qb,qp,ds) is implemented in
subsequent time periods κ(s) > 1.
We denote the first optimization problem by ED, since it optimizes only generation setpoints (qb,qp) assuming
constant demand d1 over the K time periods, and hence it is on the same timescale as the existing economic
dispatch mechanism. We denote the second optimization problem by FR, since it optimizes regulation generators’
recourse production rps in subsequent time periods, and hence it is on the same timescale as the existing frequency
regulation mechanism.
Definition 1. We say that SY STEM can be optimally decomposed into ED-FR if (qb,qp, rp) is an optimal
solution to SY STEM if and only if rp1 = 0, (q
b,qp) is an optimal solution to ED(d1), and rps is an optimal
solution to FR(qb,qp,ds) for all s ∈ S.
Theorem 1 (Decomposition). Let λs and (
¯
µs, µ¯s) be any Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (3)
and (5) respectively in SY STEM .
(a) If δ is the average, over all time periods, of the difference between the expected nodal prices in each period
and that in period 1, that is, for each n ∈ N ,
δn =
∑
s∈S
ps
(
pin(λs,
¯
µs, µ¯s)− pin(λ1,
¯
µ1, µ¯1)
)
, (7)
then SY STEM can be optimally decomposed into ED-FR.
(b) If SY STEM can be optimally decomposed into ED-FR, then for all n such that
¯
qbn < q
b
n < q¯
b
n and
¯
qpn < q
p
1,n < q¯
p
n, (7) holds.
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7The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the Appendix. The result follows from analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
conditions of the system operator’s problem and those of ED and FR. As mentioned, we denote the two sub-
problems by ED and FR because they focus on the economic dispatch and frequency regulation timescales
respectively. Hence, these sub-problems can serve as guides for the optimal design of economic dispatch and
frequency regulation mechanisms. The insights are immediate in the case of economic dispatch and we show how
ED leads to an improved market mechanism in Section V. However, the insights may not be as clear in the case
of frequency regulation. We show in Section IV that FR can in fact be solved via distributed frequency control
algorithms, although these algorithms deviate from current practice that do not optimize generation costs.
The most important feature of Theorem 1 is that, one way to choose generation setpoints optimally at the economic
dispatch timescale, is to include, in the optimization objective, an offset of the dispatch generators’ marginal costs
by the expected changes in nodal prices during the frequency regulation timescale. The latter can be interpreted
as the expected changes in the marginal value of dispatch generation. Hence, if the latter is zero, then generation
setpoints can be chosen optimally at the economic dispatch timescale without regard to the behavior of the system
in the frequency regulation timescale [1].
An important extension of this result is to understand the efficiency loss of the decomposition when we are
unable to estimate the RHS of (7) accurately. Note that negative estimation errors cause ED(d1) to use less
than optimal dispatch resources (and more than optimal regulation resources) and vice versa. We investigate the
efficiency loss in Section VI. In such situations, the dispatch generation qb might not be optimal, and therefore
FR(qb,qp,ds) might not be feasible. To ensure that FR(qb,qp,ds) is feasible, we may modify ED(d1) into a
robust optimization problem by adding constraints (qb,qp, rps) ∈ Ω(ds) for all s ∈ S \ {1}. The size of such a
problem is exponential in S but can be reduced using the technique in [20]. Note that this should not be viewed as
a drawback of our decomposition, as the current practice based on AGC might also not be feasible. In practice, the
risks of infeasibility are mitigated using reserves. Moreover, our decomposition has the advantage that it coordinates
the economic dispatch and frequency regulation resources efficiently, and hence, may reduce reserve requirements.
Theorem 1 is close in spirit to work in communication networks that use optimization decomposition to justify
and optimize protocol layering [21]–[23]. Hence, Theorem 1 provides a rigorous way to think about architectural
design of power networks.
IV. DISTRIBUTED FREQUENCY REGULATION
This section illustrates how to implement the solution to FR using distributed frequency regulation controllers.
Besides achieving optimality, a practical implementation should preserve network stability, be robust to unexpected
system events, aggregate network information in a distributed manner, and satisfy constraints (2), (3) and (5). The
distributed algorithm that we provide in this section satisfies all the above characteristics. It can be interpreted as
performing distributed frequency regulation by sending different regulation signals to each bus.
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8A. Dynamic model
Before introducing our algorithm we add dynamics to our system model to describe the system behavior within
a single time period. Let t denote the time evolution within the time period of outcome s, and assume without
loss of generality that t ∈ (k, k + 1] where k = κ(s). Let rps(t) := (rps,n(t), n ∈ N) denote the recourse quantities
generated by the regulation generators at time t. We assume that dispatch generation and demand do not change
within the time period.
Then, the system changes within the time period are governed by the swing equations which we assume to be:
θ˙s(t) = ωs(t); (8a)
Mω˙s(t) = q
b + qp + rps(t)− ds −Dωs(t)− Lθs(t), (8b)
where ωs(t) := (ωs,n(t), n ∈ N) are the frequency deviations from the nominal value at time t, θs(t) :=
(θs,n(t), n ∈ N) are the phase angles at time t, M := diag(M1, . . . ,MN ) where Mn is the aggregate inertia
of the generators at node n, and D := diag(D1, . . . , DN ) where Dn is the aggregate damping of the generators
at node n. The notation x˙ denotes the time derivative, i.e. x˙ = dx/dt. Equation (8) is a linearized version of the
nonlinear network dynamics [3], [24], and has been widely used in the design of frequency regulation controllers.
See, e.g., [11], [25].
B. Distributed frequency regulation
We now introduce a distributed, continuous-time algorithm that provably solves FR while preserving system
stability. Our solution is based on a novel reverse and forward engineering approach for distributed control design
in power systems [14], [15], [26]–[29]. The algorithm operates as follows. Each regulation generator n updates its
power generation using
rps,n(t) = [c
p′−1
n (−ωs,n(t)− pips,n(t))]q¯
p
n−qpn
¯
qpn−qpn , (9)
where cp′n (x) =
∂
∂xc
p
n(x) and c
p′−1
n denotes its inverse. The projection [r]
q¯pn−qpn
¯
qpn−qpn ensures that ¯
qpn− qpn ≤ r ≤ q¯pn− qpn
(or equivalently
¯
qpn ≤ r + qpn ≤ q¯pn) and pips,n(t) is a control signal generated using:
DFR : p˙ips(t) = ζ
pi
(
qb + qp + rps(t)− ds −Lφs(t)
)
; (10a)
˙¯µs(t) = ζ
µ¯
[
BC>φs(t)− f
]+
µ¯s
; (10b)
¯
µ˙s(t) = ζ¯
µ
[− f −BC>φs(t)]+
¯
µs
; (10c)
φ˙s(t) = χ
φ
(
Lpips(t)−CB(µ¯s(t)−
¯
µs(t))
)
, (10d)
where ζpi := diag(ζpi1 , . . . , ζ
pi
N ), ζ
µ¯ := diag(ζ µ¯1 , . . . , ζ
µ¯
L), ζ¯
µ := diag(ζ¯
µ
1 , . . . , ζ¯
µ
L), χ
φ := diag(χφ1 , . . . , χ
φ
N ) denote
the respective control gains. The element-wise projection [y]+x := ([yn]
+
xn , n ∈ N) ensures that the dynamics
x˙ = [y]+x have a solution x(t) that remains in the positive orthant, that is, [yn]
+
xn = 0 if xn = 0 and yn < 0, and
[yn]
+
xn = yn otherwise.
October 8, 2018 DRAFT
9The proposed solution (9) – (10) can be interpreted as a frequency regulation algorithm in which each regulation
generator receives a different regulation signal (9) depending on its location in the network. The key step in the
design of DFR is reformulating FR into the following equivalent optimization problem:
FR′(qb, qp,ds) :
min
rps ,ωs,vs,φs
∑
n∈N
(
cpn(q
p
n + r
p
s,n) +Dnω
2
s,n/2
)
s.t. qb + qp + rps − ds −Dωs = Cvs; (11a)
qb + qp + rps − ds = Lφs; (11b)
− f ≤ BC>φs ≤ f ; (11c)
¯
qp ≤ qp ≤ q¯p. (11d)
Recall from Section II-C that vs denote line flows. Constraint (11a) is reformulated from the per node supply-
demand balance constraint (4), and makes explicit the fact that, whenever supply and demand do not match, the
mismatch is compensated by a change in the frequency. Constraint (11b) ensures that ωs = 0 at the optimal solution
so that supply and demand are balanced. Constraint (11c) imposes line flow limits. However, instead of using actual
line flows vs, these limits are imposed on virtual flows BC>φs, which are identical to line flows at the optimal
solution [14].
It can be shown that FR′ has a primal-dual algorithm that contains the component (8) resembling power network
dynamics and the components (9) – (10) that can be implemented via distributed communication and computation.
This new problem FR′ also makes explicit the role of frequency in maintaining supply-demand balance.
The next proposition formally relates the optimal solutions of FR and FR′ and guarantees the optimality of
(9) – (10).
Proposition 1 (Optimality). Let rps and (rp′s ,ω′s,v′s,φ
′
s) be optimal solutions of FR and FR
′ respectively. Then,
the following statements are true: (i) Frequency restoration: ω′s = 0; (ii) Generation equivalence: r
p
s = r
p′
s ;
(iii) Line flow equivalence: H
(
qb + qp + rps − ds
)
= BC>φ′s. Moreover, there exists θ
′
s ∈ RN and y′s ∈ RL,
satisfying Cy′s = 0, such that v
′
s = BC
>θ′s + y
′
s and BC
>φ′s = BC
>θ′s. And (r
p′
s ,ω
′
s,θ
′
s,φ
′
s,pi
p′
s ,
¯
µ′s, µ¯
′
s) is
an equilibrium point of (8) – (10) if and only if (rp′s ,ω
′
s,v
′
s,φ
′
s,pi
p′
s ,
¯
µ′s, µ¯
′
s) is a primal-dual optimal solution of
FR′, where ω′s, pi
p′
s , and (
¯
µ′s, µ¯
′
s) are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (11a), (11b), and (11c),
respectively.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the Appendix. What remains is to guarantee the convergence of the
distributed frequency regulation algorithm.
Proposition 2 (Convergence). If cpn is twice continuous differentiable with cp′′n ≥ α > 0 (i.e., α-strictly convex)
and cpn(q
p
n + r
p
s,n)→+∞ as qpn + rps,n→{
¯
qpn, q¯
p
n}, then rps(t) in (8) – (10) converge globally to an optimal solution
of FR.
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The proof of Proposition 2 follows from [14] and uses the machinery developed in [30] to handle projec-
tions (10b) – (10c). By substituting the line flows vs(t) = BC>θs(t) into (8) and eliminating θs(t), we can show
that the entire system (8) – (10) is a primal-dual algorithm of FR′ (see [14, Theorem 5]). Therefore, Theorem
10 in [14] guarantees global asymptotic convergence to an equilibrium point which by Proposition 1 is an optimal
solution of both FR′ and FR. Our setup is simpler than the controllers in [14], which had additional states, but the
same proof technique applies. Although Proposition 2 requires costs to blow up as regulation generations approach
minimum and maximum capacities, this assumption is not restrictive, as it can be achieved by adding a barrier
function to the actual cost before implementing in the controllers.
V. MARKET MECHANISM FOR ECONOMIC DISPATCH
This section illustrates how to implement the solution to ED through a market mechanism for economic dispatch.
The mechanism works in the following manner. In the first time period, the ISO collects supply function bids from
generators (both dispatch and regulation) and uses those bids to solve ED. Then, in subsequent time periods, the
ISO uses the regulation generators’ supply function bids to implement the controller in (9). This mechanism is
efficient if SY STEM can be decomposed into ED-FR and does not require any more communication than the
existing market mechanisms used in practice.
A. Market model
We assume that generators are price-takers. Let pibn denote the price paid to dispatch generator n in each period
and pips,n denote the price paid to regulation generator n in outcome s. Then, the expected profit of the dispatch
and regulation generators at node n are:
PFbn(q
b
n, pi
b
n) := K
(
pibnq
b
n − cbn(qbn)
)
,
PFpn((q
p
n + r
p
s,n, pi
p
s,n), s ∈ S)
:=
∑
s∈S
ps
(
pips,n
(
qpn + r
p
s,n
)− cpn(qpn + rps,n)) .
Note that the regulation generator’s profit is a function of its total production qpn + r
p
s,n in each outcome s ∈ S.
The supply function bids indicate the quantities the generators are willing to produce at every price. We assume
that these bids are chosen from a parameterized family of functions. In particular, for node n, we represent the
dispatch and regulation generators’ supply functions by parameters αbn > 0 and α
p
n > 0 respectively, and these bids
indicate that the dispatch generator is willing to supply the quantity qbn = [α
b
ns
b
n(pi
b
n)]
q¯bn
¯
qbn
in the first time period
and the regulation generator is willing to supply the quantity qpn + r
p
s,n = [α
p
ns
p
n(pi
p
s,n)]
q¯pn
¯
qpn
in outcome s, for some
fixed functions sbn : [
¯
qbn, q¯
b
n]→ R+ and spn : [
¯
qpn, q¯
p
n]→ R+.1 We also assume that sbn(pibn) 6= 0 for all pibn ∈ R and
1Numerous studies have explored different functional forms of the supply functions and their impact on market efficiency, e.g., see [7],
[31]–[34]. The focus of this work is on illustrating that ED can be implemented using a simple market mechanism. Hence, we restrict ourselves
to linearly parameterized supply functions and leave the analyses of other more sophisticated supply functions to future work. We refer the
reader to [33] for some appealing properties of linearly parameterized supply functions.
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spn(pi
p
s,n) 6= 0 for all pips,n ∈ R.2 The generators choose their bids to maximize their profits subject to their capacity
constraints. Note that the regulation generator submits only one supply function for all possible outcomes. Hence,
its bid in the economic dispatch timescale is also used as its bid in the frequency regulation timescale.
The system operator interprets bids αbn and α
p
n as signals that the dispatch and regulation generators at node n
have marginal costs pibn and pi
p
s,n respectively when supplying quantities α
b
ns
b
n(pi
b
n) and α
p
ns
p
n(pi
p
s,n) respectively.
Hence, it associates with the generators the following bid cost functions:
cˆbn(q
b
n) :=
∫ qbn
¯
qbn
(sbn)
−1(w/αbn) dw, (12)
cˆpn(q
p
n) :=
∫ qpn
¯
qpn
(spn)
−1(w/αpn) dw. (13)
Let αb := (αbn, n ∈ N) and αp := (αpn, n ∈ N) denote the vectors of bids. Given bids (αb,αp), the system
operator solves ED to minimize expected bid costs. The prices for the regulation generator in the first time period
are the nodal prices in ED while the prices for the dispatch generator are the nodal prices offset by δ. Then, in
each subsequent outcome s ∈ S, the system operator implements the controller in (9) using regulation generators’
bid costs. The prices are the nodal prices in FR (which are computed by DFR).
B. Market equilibrium
Our focus is on understanding the efficiency of the mechanism. Formally, we consider the following notion of a
competitive equilibrium.
Definition 2. We say that bids (αb,αp) are a competitive equilibrium if there exists prices pib ∈ RN and pip =
(pips , s ∈ S) ∈ RNS such that:
(a) For all n, αbn is an optimal solution to:
max
αˆbn>0
PFbn
(
[αˆbns
b
n(pi
b
n)]
q¯bn
¯
qbn
, pibn
)
.
(b) For all n, αpn is an optimal solution to:
max
αˆpn>0
PFpn
(
([αˆpns
p
n(pi
p
s,n)]
q¯pn
¯
qpn
, pips,n), s ∈ S
)
.
(c) pib = (1/K)
(
pi(λ1,
¯
µ1, µ¯1) + δ
)
and pip1 = (1/K)pi(λ1,
¯
µ1, µ¯1) where λ1 and (
¯
µ1, µ¯1) are the Lagrange
multipliers associated with constraints (3) and (5) respectively in:
ˆED(d1) : min
qb,qp
∑
n∈N
(
Kcˆbn(q
b
n) +Kcˆ
p
n(q
p
n)− δnqbn
)
s.t. (qb,qp,0) ∈ Ω(d1).
2This assumption is a technical condition to avoid the degenerate situation where a generator’s supply quantity is not sensitive to its bid
parameter which would occur if sbn(pi
b
n) = 0 or s
p
n(pi
p
s,n) = 0.
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(d) For all s ∈ S, pips = pi(λs,
¯
µs, µ¯s) where λs and (
¯
µs, µ¯s) are the Lagrange multipliers associated with
constraints (3) and (5) respectively in:
ˆFR(qb,qp,ds) : min
rps
∑
n∈N
cˆpn(q
p
n + r
p
s,n)
s.t. (qb,qp, rps) ∈ Ω(ds),
where qb =
(
[αbns
b
n(pi
b
n)]
q¯bn
¯
qbn
, n ∈ N
)
and qp =
(
[αpns
p
n(pi
p
1,n)]
q¯pn
¯
qpn
, n ∈ N
)
.
At each node n ∈ N , the dispatch and regulation generators produce at setpoints [αbnsbn(pibn)]q¯
b
n
¯
qbn
and [αpns
p
n(pi
p
1,n)]
q¯pn
¯
qpn
respectively in period 1, and the regulation generator produces an additional quantity [αpns
p
n(pi
p
s,n)]
q¯pn
¯
qpn
−[αpnspn(pip1,n)]q¯
p
n
¯
qpn
in outcome s ∈ S.
The following is our main result for this section. It highlights that, as a consequence of Theorem 1, any competitive
equilibrium is efficient.
Proposition 3 (Efficiency). Suppose that, for each n ∈ N , the functions sbn(·) = cb′−1n (·)/γbn and spn(·) =
cp′−1n (·)/γpn for some constants γbn, γpn > 0. Let λs and (
¯
µs, µ¯s) be the Lagrange multipliers associated with
constraints (3) and (5) respectively in SY STEM . Suppose that (7) holds. Then:
(a) Any competitive equilibrium has a production schedule that solves SY STEM .
(b) Any production schedule that solves SY STEM can be sustained by a competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 3 resembles classical welfare theorems, e.g., [33], [35]–[37]. However, it differs from typical com-
petitive equilibria frameworks because each regulation generator is restricted to bidding a single supply function
over the entire economic dispatch interval even though there are multiple fast timescale instances. The latter creates
challenges in guaranteeing existence and efficiency of equilibria that do not arise in typical competitive equilibria
frameworks. In particular, the space of bid functions needs to be sufficiently expressive for generators to convey their
costs over multiple fast timescale instances via a single bid function. This is not an issue in market frameworks where
separate bids are collected for separate market instances. Proposition 3 circumvented this challenge by restricting
supply functions to be in the linear space of regulation generators’ true cost functions. An important extension is to
understand the existence and efficiency of equilibria under less restrictive bid spaces. Proposition 3 also highlights
that nodal pricing is not always efficient and that the pricing mechanism needs to be jointly designed and analyzed
with decomposition principles in order to achieve efficiency.
VI. CASE STUDY
The efficiency of the mechanisms in Sections IV and V depends on how accurately the system operator can predict
the RHS of equation (7). In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of the performance of the decomposition to
the value of δ using a case study on the IEEE 24-bus reliability test system [38].
Table I summarizes the properties of the generators on the system. We assume that the hydro and combustion
turbine (CT) generators are regulation resources while all other generators are dispatch resources. Note that, the
hydro resources, which generate between 60 to 300 MW, have the lowest marginal cost, while the CT resources,
which generate between 64 to 80 MW, have the highest marginal cost.
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TABLE I: Generators on test system.
Unit Group Unit Type Production Marginal Cost Assignment
Range (MW) Range ($/MWh)
U12 Oil/Steam [10, 60] [58.14, 64.446] Dispatch
U20 Oil/CT [64, 80] [130.0, 130.0] Regulation
U50 Hydro [60, 300] [0.001, 0.001] Regulation
U76 Coal/Steam [60, 304] [16.511, 18.231] Dispatch
U100 Oil/Steam [75, 300] [46.295, 54.196] Dispatch
U155 Coal/Steam [216, 620] [13.294, 14.974] Dispatch
U197 Oil/Steam [207, 591] [49.57, 51.405] Dispatch
U350 Coal/Steam [140, 350] [13.22, 15.276] Dispatch
U400 Nuclear [200, 800] [4.466, 4.594] Dispatch
We assume that there are K = 20 time periods in the economic dispatch interval. Hence, each time period lasts
15 seconds. We construct the scenario tree as follows. Abusing notation, let dk ∈ RN denote the demand at all
nodes in period k. Set d1 to the values in the test system data and let
dk = diag
(
1+
k−1∑
k′=1
wk′
)
· d1,
where wk′ ∼ N (µd1, (0.0022)I) is a Gaussian vector with mean µd1 and covariance (0.0022)I. We simulate
µd = −0.0002, 0,+0.0002 to model scenarios with increasing, constant, and decreasing demands, respectively. For
each value of µd, we generate 50 length-K samples of the random process and assign equal probabilities to all the
samples. Hence, the scenario tree is a tall tree, where the root node has 50 children, and all other nodes either have
one child or is a leaf node. Fig. 2 shows the sample trajectories of total system demand. The RHS of equation (7)
have values δ∗n = −80.34, 49.67, 49.72 (in $/MWh) corresponding to µd = −0.0002, 0,+0.0002, respectively. Note
that the optimal δn is non-zero even when the demand evolution has zero mean. To study the impact when δ
deviates from δ∗, we consider
δ = δ∗ + ,
where  ∼ N (µ1, σ2 I). Hence, µ and σ can be interpreted as the bias and standard deviation of the prediction
errors. Given any specified µ and σ, we generate 50 samples of δ and randomly match these samples to the 50
demand samples. Fig. 3 shows the percentage increase in average total costs under the decomposition (compared
to the optimal solution) for different values of µ and σ.
Observe the asymmetry in the plots between the different choices of µ. In particular, when demand is constant
(µd = 0) or increasing (µd = 0.0002), the sub-optimality is less sensitive to negative prediction errors (µ = −10)
than to positive prediction errors (µ = 10). This phenomenon is due to high utilization of regulation resources
at the optimal solution. Since majority of the regulation resources are hydro resources with low marginal costs,
almost all the regulation resources are dispatched in the first time period, and there are less than 30MW of unused
regulation capacity. Recall that negative prediction errors create incentive for economic dispatch to use less-than-
optimal dispatch resources and more-than-optimal regulation resources. However, in the scenario with increasing
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Fig. 2: Samples paths of total demand.
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Fig. 3: Percentage change in average total costs under ED-FR.
demand, system demand increases by up to about 30MW. This deviation must be met by regulation resources,
and since there are only 30MW of unused regulation capacity, the economic dispatch mechanism is unable to
significantly increase the usage of regulation resources in the first time period, and therefore the sub-optimality is
small under negative prediction errors. On the other hand, at the optimal solution, there is significant excess capacity
of dispatch resources. Hence, positive prediction errors could lead to significantly more usage of dispatch resources
and less usage of regulation resources, and cause a larger increase in total costs. We do not observe this asymmetry
when demand is decreasing. This is due to the fact that δ∗n = −80.34 and hence a larger positive prediction error
is needed for the asymmetry to manifest.
The simulations illustrate the complex interactions between δ and the performance of ED-FR. In particular,
both marginal costs and feasibility constraints have crucial impacts on the performance of ED-FR.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes an optimization decomposition approach for co-optimizing economic dispatch and frequency
regulation resources. It demonstrates that optimization decomposition provides a rigorous way to design power
system operations to allocate resources efficiently across timescales. Our main result, in Theorem 1, shows one way
to choose generation setpoints optimally at the economic dispatch timescale, and provides a guide on how to design
a principled architecture for power system operations. In particular, using this result, we design an optimal frequency
control scheme and an optimal economic dispatch mechanism, both of which differ from existing approaches in
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crucial ways and reveal potential inefficiencies in the latter. Hence, this paper underscores the need to jointly analyze
economic dispatch and frequency regulation mechanisms when investigating the efficiency of the overall system.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. The result follows from analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of SY STEM ,
ED, and FR. However, we first reformulate the problems as the notations are simpler with the reformulations.
Define qps := q
p + rps . Note that, due to the constraint that r
p
1 = 0, there is a bijection between the set of feasible
(qb,qp, rp) and the set of feasible (qb,qp1, . . . ,q
p
S). Hence, SY STEM can be reformulated as:
min
qb,qp1 ,...,q
p
S
∑
s∈S
ps
∑
n∈N
(
cbn(q
b
n) + c
p
n(q
p
s,n)
)
s.t. (qb,qp1,q
p
s − qp1) ∈ Ω(ds), ∀s ∈ S.
(14)
Also, ED(d1) can be reformulated as:
min
qb,qp1
∑
n∈N
(
Kcbn(q
b
n) +Kc
p
n(q
p
1,n)− δnqbn
)
s.t. (qb,qp1,0) ∈ Ω(d1).
(15)
And, FR(qb,qp,ds) can be reformulated as:
min
qps
∑
n∈N
cpn(q
p
s,n)
s.t. (qb,qp1,q
p
s − qp1) ∈ Ω(ds).
(16)
Hence, SY STEM can be optimally decomposed into ED-FR if (qb,qp1, . . . ,q
p
S) is an optimal solution to (14)
if and only if (qb,qp1) is an optimal solution to (15) and q
p
s is an optimal solution to (16) for all s ∈ S.
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Next, we prove (a). It is easy to see that (14) has compact sub-level sets. Moreover, its objective function is
strictly convex. Hence, (14) has a unique optimal solution. By similar arguments, we conclude that (15) has a unique
optimal solution, and that (16) has a unique optimal solution if the set
{
qps ∈ RN : (qb,qp1,qps − qp1) ∈ Ω(ds)
}
is
non-empty. Hence, to prove (a), it suffices to show the forward implication, that is, if (7) holds, then (qb,qp1, . . . ,q
p
S)
is an optimal solution to (14) implies that (qb,qp1) is an optimal solution to (15) and q
p
s is an optimal solution
to (16) for all s ∈ S. The reverse implication follows from the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solutions.
Let the Lagrangian of (14) be denoted by:
L(qb,qp1, . . . ,q
p
S ,
¯
ξ, ξ¯,
¯
ν, ν¯,
¯
µ, µ¯,λ)
:=
∑
s∈S
ps
∑
n∈N
(
cbn(q
b
n) + c
p
n(q
p
s,n)
)
+ Lb(qb,
¯
ξ, ξ¯)
+
∑
s∈S
psL
p(qps , ¯
νs, ν¯s) +
∑
s∈S
psL
f (qb,qps ,
¯
µs, µ¯s)
−
∑
s∈S
psλs1
> (qb + qps − ds) ,
where:
Lb(qb,
¯
ξ, ξ¯) :=
¯
ξ>
(
¯
qb − qb)+ ξ¯> (qb − q¯b)
Lp(qps , ¯
νs, ν¯s) :=
¯
ν>s
(
¯
qp − qps
)
+ ν¯>s (q
p
s − q¯p)
Lf (qb,qps ,
¯
µs, µ¯s) :=
¯
µ>s
(−f −H (qb + qps − ds))
+ µ¯>s
(
H
(
qb + qps − ds
)− f) .
Note that we scaled the constraints by their probabilities, and
¯
ξ ∈ RN+ , ξ¯ ∈ RN+ , ¯ν = (¯νs, s ∈ S) ∈ R
NS
+ ,
ν¯ = (ν¯s, s ∈ S) ∈ RNS+ ,
¯
µ = (
¯
µs, s ∈ S) ∈ RLS+ , µ¯ = (µ¯s, s ∈ S) ∈ RLS+ , λ = (λs, s ∈ S) ∈ RS are appropriate
Lagrange multipliers.
Since (14) has a convex objective and linear constraints, from the KKT conditions, we infer that (qb,qp1, . . . ,q
p
S)
is an optimal solution to (14) if and only if (qb,qp1,q
p
s − qp1) ∈ Ω(ds) for all s ∈ S and there exists
¯
ξ, ξ¯ ∈
RN+ , ¯
ν, ν¯ ∈ RNS+ ,
¯
µ, µ¯ ∈ RLS+ ,λ ∈ RS such that:(
Kcb′n (q
b
n), n ∈ N
)
+ ξ¯ −
¯
ξ −
∑
s∈S
pspi(λs,
¯
µs, µ¯s) = 0; (17a)
Lb(qb,
¯
ξ, ξ¯) = 0; (17b)(
cp′n (q
p
s,n), n ∈ N
)
+ ν¯s −
¯
νs − pi(λs,
¯
µs, µ¯s) = 0; (17c)
Lp(qps , ¯
νs, ν¯s) = 0; (17d)
Lf (qb,qps ,
¯
µs, µ¯s) = 0, (17e)
for all s ∈ S.
October 8, 2018 DRAFT
18
Similarly, (qb,qp1) is an optimal solution to (15) if and only if (q
b,qp1,0) ∈ Ω(d1) and there exists
¯
ξ, ξ¯ ∈
RN+ , ¯
ν1, ν¯1 ∈ RN+ ,
¯
µ1, µ¯1 ∈ RL+, λ1 ∈ R such that:(
Kcb′n (q
b
n), n ∈ N
)
+ ξ¯ −
¯
ξ − pi(λ1,
¯
µ1, µ¯1)− δ = 0; (18a)
Lb(qb,
¯
ξ, ξ¯) = 0; (18b)(
Kcp′n (q
p
1,n), n ∈ N
)
+ ν¯1 −
¯
ν1 − pi(λ1,
¯
µ1, µ¯1) = 0; (18c)
Lp(qp1, ¯
ν1, ν¯1) = 0; (18d)
Lf (qb,qp1,
¯
µ1, µ¯1) = 0. (18e)
And qps is an optimal solution to (16) if and only if (q
b,qp1,q
p
s − qp1) ∈ Ω(ds) and there exists ¯νs, ν¯s ∈
RN+ ,
¯
µs, µ¯s ∈ RL+, λs ∈ R such that:(
cp′n (q
p
s,n), n ∈ N
)
+ ν¯s −
¯
νs − pi(λs,
¯
µs, µ¯s) = 0; (19a)
Lp(qps , ¯
νs, ν¯s) = 0; (19b)
Lf (qb,qps ,
¯
µs, µ¯s) = 0. (19c)
Suppose (qb,qp1, . . . ,q
p
S) is an optimal solution to (14) with associated Lagrange multipliers (
¯
ξ, ξ¯,
¯
ν, ν¯,
¯
µ, µ¯,λ).
Note that (qb,qp1,0) ∈ Ω(d1). From the fact that the variables (qb,
¯
ξ, ξ¯,
¯
µ, µ¯, λ) satisfy (17a) and (7) and the
fact that
∑
s∈S ps = K, we infer that the variables (q
b,
¯
ξ, ξ¯,K
¯
µ1,Kµ¯1,Kλ1) satisfy (18a). From the fact that
(qb,qps , ξ¯,
¯
ξ, ν¯s,
¯
νs, µ¯s,
¯
µs, λs) satisfy (17b) – (17e), we infer that the variables (q
b,qp1, ξ¯,
¯
ξ,Kν¯1,K
¯
ν1,Kµ¯1,K
¯
µ1,Kλ1)
satisfy (18b) – (18e). Hence, (qb,qp1) is an optimal solution to (15). Note also that (q
b,qp1,q
p
s − qp1) ∈ Ω(ds) for
all s ∈ S. From the fact that the variables (qb,qps , ¯νs, ν¯s, ¯
µs, µ¯s, λs) satisfy (17c) – (17e), we infer that those
variables satisfy (19). Hence, qps is an optimal solution to (16) for all s ∈ S.
Next, we prove (b). Let (qb,qp1, . . . ,q
p
S) be a solution to (14) such that (q
b,qp1) is a solution to (15). If
¯
qbn < q
b
n <
q¯bn and
¯
qpn < q
p
1,n < q¯
p
n, then the complementary slackness conditions imply that
¯
ξn = ξ¯n = 0 and
¯
ν1,n = ν¯1,n = 0.
From the KKT conditions of (14), which are given by (17), we infer that:
Kcb′n (q
b
n)−
∑
s∈S
pspin(λs,
¯
µs, µ¯s) = 0; (20)
cp′n (q
p
1,n)− pin(λ1,
¯
µ1, µ¯1) = 0, (21)
where (
¯
µs, µ¯s,λ) are the associated Lagrange multipliers. From the KKT conditions of (15), which are given
by (18), we infer that:
Kcb′n (q
b
n)− pin(λ′1,
¯
µ′1, µ¯
′
1)− δn = 0; (22)
Kcp′n (q
p
1,n)− pin(λ′1,
¯
µ′1, µ¯
′
1) = 0, (23)
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where (
¯
µ′s, µ¯
′
s,λ
′) are the associated Lagrange multipliers. It follows that:
δn =
∑
s∈S
pspin(λs,
¯
µs, µ¯s)− pin(λ′1,
¯
µ′1, µ¯
′
1)
=
∑
s∈S
pspin(λs,
¯
µs, µ¯s)−Kpin(λ1,
¯
µ1, µ¯1)
=
∑
s∈S
ps
(
pin(λs,
¯
µs, µ¯s)− pin(λ1,
¯
µ1, µ¯1)
)
.
The first equality follows from comparing (20) and (22). The second equality follows from comparing (21) and (23).
The last equality follows from the fact that
∑
s∈S ps = K.
Proof of Proposition 1. We provide a proof sketch of this result. The skipped details can be found in [14]. (i)
follows from the KKT conditions of FR′(qb,qp,ds) and is shown in [14, Lemma 2]. Since ω′s = 0, it follows
from constraints (11a) and (11b) of FR′(qb,qp,ds) that Lθ′s = Lφ
′
s, which, since the null space of L is span{1},
implies that θ′s = φ
′
s + α1 for some α ∈ R. This implies that BC>φ′s = BC>θ′s. Therefore, without loss of
generality, we can substitute constraint (11a) in FR′(qb,qp,ds) by the constraint ωs = 0. Then, using the definition
of H and the equivalence between (3) and (4), we infer that the feasible sets of FR(qb,qp,ds) and FR′(qb,qp,ds)
are equivalent. Finally, since cpn(·) is strictly convex, by uniqueness of the optimal solutions, we get (ii). Lastly, (iii)
follows from the definition of H and BC>φ′s = BC
>θ′s. The final statement of the proposition follows directly
from [14, Theorem 8].
Proof of Proposition 3. Our proof proceeds in 6 steps: (1) Characterizing regulation generators’ optimal bids
αp given their prices pip; (2) Characterizing dispatch generators’ optimal bids αb given their prices pib; (3)
Characterizing prices (pib,pip) given bids (αb,αp) using KKT conditions; (4) Showing that, at an equilibrium, the
production schedule is the unique optimal solution to ˆED- ˆFR; (5) Showing that any production schedule (qb,qp, rp)
that solves SY STEM can be obtained using bids (γb,γp) and the latter satisfy the equilibrium characterizations
in steps 1 to 3; and (6) Showing that any bids (αb,αp) that satisfy the equilibrium characterizations in steps 1 to
3 give the same production schedule as that under bids (γb,γp) (which also solves SY STEM ). Note that part (a)
follows from step 6 and part (b) follows from step 5.
Step 1: Characterizing regulation generators’ optimal bids αp given their prices pip. Since cpn is strictly convex
and cpn(q
p
s,n)→+∞ as qps,n→{
¯
qpn, q¯
p
n}, cp′n is invertible. Let σ :S→S be any permutation function that satisfies:
cp′−1n (pi
p
σ(1),n) ≤ cp′−1n (pipσ(2),n) ≤ . . . ≤ cp′−1n (pipσ(S),n),
and let integers i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , S} be such that:
cp′−1n (pi
p
σ(s),n) ≤
¯
qpn ∀s = 1, . . . , i; (24a)
¯
qpn < c
p′−1
n (pi
p
σ(s),n) < q¯
p
n ∀s = i+ 1, . . . , j; (24b)
q¯pn ≤ cp′−1n (pipσ(s),n) ∀s = j + 1, . . . , S. (24c)
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We now show that αpn ∈ R++ maximizes PFpn if and only if:
αpns
p
n(pi
p
σ(s),n) ≤
¯
qpn ∀s = 1, . . . , i; (25a)
αpns
p
n(pi
p
σ(s),n) = c
p′−1
n (pi
p
σ(k),n) ∀s = i+ 1, . . . , j; (25b)
αpns
p
n(pi
p
σ(s),n) ≥ q¯pn ∀s = j + 1, . . . , S. (25c)
For notational brevity, in the rest of this step, we abuse notation and let:
qps,n(α
p
n) = [α
p
ns
p
n(pi
p
σ(s),n)]
q¯pn
¯
qpn
.
To prove our characterization, it suffices to show that, given any αpn ∈ R++ that satisfies (25), the vector of
per-outcome profits (
pipσ(s),nq
p
s,n(α
p
n)− cpn
(
qps,n(α
p
n)
)
, s ∈ S
)

(
pipσ(s),nq
p
s,n(α¯
p
n)− cpn
(
qps,n(α¯
p
n)
)
, s ∈ S
)
(26)
for any α¯pn that does not satisfy (25). Since pσ(s) > 0 for all s ∈ S, it then follows that:
PFpn|αpn =
∑
s
pσ(s)
(
pipσ(s),nq
p
s,n(α
p
n)− cpn
(
qps,n(α
p
n)
))
>
∑
s
pσ(s)
(
pipσ(s),nq
p
s,n(α¯
p
n)− cpn
(
qps,n(α¯
p
n)
))
= PFpn|α¯pn .
Suppose s ∈ {1, . . . , i}. From (24a) and the fact that cpn is strictly convex, we infer that pipσ(s),n ≤ cp′n (
¯
qpn).
From (25a), we infer that qps,n(α
p
n) =
¯
qpn. Then:
cpn(q
p
s,n(α¯
p
n))
≥ cpn(
¯
qpn) + c
p′
n (
¯
qpn)
(
qps,n(α¯
p
n)−
¯
qpn
)
≥ cpn(
¯
qpn) + pi
p
σ(s),n
(
qps,n(α¯
p
n)−
¯
qpn
)
= cpn(q
p
s,n(α
p
n)) + pi
p
σ(s),n
(
qps,n(α¯
p
n)− qps,n(αpn)
)
,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that cpn is strictly convex, the second inequality follows from
pipσ(s),n ≤ cp′n (
¯
qpn) and q
p
s,n(α¯
p
n) ≥
¯
qpn, and the last equality follows from q
p
s,n(α
p
n) =
¯
qpn. Furthermore, if q
p
s,n(α¯
p
n) >
¯
qpn, then the first inequality is strict, and hence:
cpn(q
p
s,n(α¯
p
n))
> cpn(q
p
s,n(α
p
n)) + pi
p
σ(s),n
(
qps,n(α¯
p
n)− qps,n(αpn)
)
.
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Suppose s ∈ {i+1, . . . , j}. From (24b) and (25b), we infer that qps,n(αpn) = cp′−1n (pipσ(s),n) and
¯
qpn < q
p
s,n(α
p
n) <
q¯pn. From
¯
qpn < q
p
s,n(α
p
n) < q¯
p
n, and the fact that s
p
n(pi
p
σ(s),n) 6= 0 and α¯pn 6= αpn, we infer that qps,n(α¯pn) 6= qps,n(αpn).
Then:
cpn(q
p
s,n(α¯
p
n))
> cpn(q
p
s,n(α
p
n)) + c
p′
n (q
p
s,n(α
p
n))
(
qps,n(α¯
p
n)− qps,n(αpn)
)
= cpn(q
p
s,n(α
p
n)) + pi
p
σ(s),n
(
qps,n(α¯
p
n)− qps,n(αpn)
)
,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that cpn is strictly convex and q
p
s,n(α¯
p
n) 6= qps,n(αpn) and the equality
follows from qps,n(α
p
n) = c
p′−1
n (pi
p
σ(s),n).
Suppose s ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , S}. From (24c) and the fact that cpn is strictly convex, we infer that pipσ(s),n ≥ cp′n (q¯pn).
From (25c), we infer that qps,n(α
p
n) = q¯
p
n. Then:
cpn(q
p
s,n(α¯
p
n))
≥ cpn(q¯pn) + cp′n (q¯pn)
(
qps,n(α¯
p
n)− q¯pn
)
≥ cpn(q¯pn) + pipσ(s),n
(
qps,n(α¯
p
n)− q¯pn
)
= cpn(q
p
s,n(α
p
n)) + pi
p
σ(s),n
(
qps,n(α¯
p
n)− qps,n(αpn)
)
,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that cpn is strictly convex, the second inequality follows from
pipσ(s),n ≥ cp′n (q¯pn) and qps,n(α¯pn) ≤ q¯pn, and the last equality follows from qps,n(αpn) = q¯pn. Furthermore, if qps,n(α¯pn) <
q¯pn, then the first inequality is strict, and hence:
cpn(q
p
s,n(α¯
p
n))
> cpn(q
p
s,n(α
p
n)) + pi
p
σ(s),n
(
qps,n(α¯
p
n)− qps,n(αpn)
)
.
Hence, for all s ∈ S:
cpn(q
p
s,n(α¯
p
n))
≥ cpn(qps,n(αpn)) + pipσ(s),n
(
qps,n(α¯
p
n − qps,n(αpn)
)
. (27)
Moreover, this inequality is strict for some s ∈ S. If i < j, the inequality is strict for s ∈ {i + 1, . . . , j}. If
i = j, then, since α¯pn does not satisfy (25), there exists some s ∈ {1, . . . , i} such that αpnspn(pipσ(s),n) >
¯
qpn or
some s ∈ {i + 1, . . . , S} such that αpnspn(pipσ(s),n) < q¯pn, and hence there exists some s ∈ {1, . . . , i} such that
qps,n(α¯
p
n) >
¯
qpn or some s ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , S} such that qps,n(α¯pn) < q¯pn, and the inequality in (27) is strict for that s.
Hence, we conclude that: (
cpn(q
p
s,n(α¯
p
n)), s ∈ S
)

(
cpn(q
p
s,n(α
p
n)) + pi
p
σ(s),n
(
qps,n(α¯
p
n)− qps,n(αpn)
)
, s ∈ S
)
for any α¯pn that does not satisfy (25). By rearranging terms, we obtain (26).
October 8, 2018 DRAFT
22
Step 2: Characterizing dispatch generators’ optimal bids αb given their prices pib. Note that the profit maximiza-
tion problem for a dispatch generator is a special case of that for a regulation generator with S = 1. By applying
the characterization in step 1, we infer that αbn ∈ R++ maximizes PFbn if and only if:
αbns
b
n(pi
b
n) ≤
¯
qbn, if c
b′−1
n (pi
b
n) ≤
¯
qbn; (28a)
αbn = γ
b
n, if
¯
qbn < c
b′−1
n (pi
b
n) < q¯
b
n; (28b)
αbns
b
n(pi
b
n) ≥ q¯bn, if q¯bn ≤ cb′−1n (pibn). (28c)
Step 3: Characterizing prices (pib,pip) given bids (αb,αp) using KKT conditions. First, we take the same
approach as in the proof of Theorem 1 and reformulate ˆED and ˆFR before applying the KKT conditions. Relabeling
the variable qp to qp1 in ˆED gives:
min
qb,qp1
∑
n∈N
(
Kcˆbn(q
b
n) +Kcˆ
p
n(q
p
1,n)− δnqbn
)
s.t. (qb,qp1,0) ∈ Ω(d1).
(29)
And substituting qps = q
p + rps in ˆFR gives:
min
qps
∑
n∈N
cˆpn(q
p
s,n)
s.t. (qb,qp1,q
p
s − qp1) ∈ Ω(ds).
(30)
Substituting sbn = c
b′−1
n (·)/γbn and spn = cp′−1n (·)/γpn into the definition of cˆbn and cˆpn implies that:
cˆbn(q
b
n) =
∫ qbn
¯
qbn
cb′n ((γ
b
n/α
b
n)w) dw,
cˆpn(q
p
n) =
∫ qpn
¯
qpn
cp′n ((γ
p
n/α
p
n)w) dw.
Hence, (29) has a continuous and strictly convex objective and linear constraints. Thus, from the KKT conditions,
(qb,qp1) is an optimal solution to (29) if and only if (q
b,qp1,0) ∈ Ω(d1) and there exists
¯
ξ, ξ¯ ∈ RN+ , ¯ν1, ν¯1 ∈
RN+ ,
¯
µ1, µ¯1 ∈ RL+, λ1 ∈ R such that:(
Kcb′n ((γ
b
n/α
b
n)q
b
n), n ∈ N
)
+ ξ¯ −
¯
ξ −Kpib = 0; (31a)
Lb(qb,
¯
ξ, ξ¯) = 0; (31b)(
Kcp′n ((γ
p
n/α
p
n)q
p
1,n), n ∈ N
)
+ ν¯1 −
¯
ν1 −Kpip1 = 0; (31c)
Lp(qp1, ¯
ν1, ν¯1) = 0; (31d)
Lf (qb,qp1,
¯
µ1, µ¯1) = 0, (31e)
where:
pib = (1/K)
(
pi(λ1,
¯
µ1, µ¯1) + δ
)
; (31f)
pip1 = (1/K)pi(λ1,
¯
µ1, µ¯1). (31g)
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Similarly, from the KKT conditions, qps is an optimal solution to (30) if and only if (q
b,qp1,q
p
s −qp1) ∈ Ω(ds) and
there exists
¯
νs, ν¯s ∈ RN+ ,
¯
µs, µ¯s ∈ RL+, λs ∈ R such that:(
cp′n ((γ
p
n/α
p
n)q
p
s,n), n ∈ N
)
+ ν¯s −
¯
νs − pips = 0; (32a)
Lp(qps , ¯
νs, ν¯s) = 0; (32b)
Lf (qb,qps ,
¯
µs, µ¯s) = 0, (32c)
where:
pips = pi(λs,
¯
µs,µs). (32d)
Step 4: Showing that, at an equilibrium, the production schedule is the unique optimal solution to ˆED- ˆFR. Let
(qb,qp) be an optimal solution to ˆED(d1) and rps be an optimal solution to ˆFR(q
b,qp,ds). We will show that:
qb =
(
[αbns
b
n(pi
b
n)]
q¯bn
¯
qbn
, n ∈ N
)
;
qp =
(
[αpns
p
n(pi
p
1,n)]
q¯pn
¯
qpn
, n ∈ N
)
;
rps =
(
[αpns
p
n(pi
p
s,n)]
q¯pn
¯
qpn
− [αpnspn(pip1,n)]q¯
p
n
¯
qpn
, n ∈ N
)
.
It suffices to show that, if (qb,qp1) is an optimal solution to (29) and q
p
s is an optimal solution to (30), then:
qb =
(
[αbns
b
n(pi
b
n)]
q¯bn
¯
qbn
, n ∈ N
)
; (33)
qps =
(
[αpns
p
n(pi
p
s,n)]
q¯pn
¯
qpn
, n ∈ N
)
. (34)
By rewriting (31a) for dispatch generator n, we infer that:
qbn = α
b
ns
b
n
(
pibn +
¯
ξn/K − ξ¯n/K
)
.
If
¯
qbn < q
b
n < q¯
b
n, then from (31b), we infer that ξ¯n =
¯
ξn = 0, which implies that qbn = α
b
ns
b
n(pi
b
n). If q
b
n =
¯
qbn,
then from (31b), we infer that ξ¯n = 0 and
¯
ξn ≥ 0, which implies that
¯
qbn = q
b
n = α
b
ns
b
n(pi
b
n +
¯
ξn/K) ≥ αbnsbn(pibn),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that cbn is strictly convex. If q
b
n = q¯
b
n, then from (31b), we infer
that
¯
ξn = 0 and ξ¯n ≥ 0, which implies that q¯bn = qbn = αbnsbn(pibn − ξ¯n/K) ≤ αbnsbn(pibn), where the last inequality
follows from the fact that cbn is strictly convex. Hence, we conclude that q
b is given by (33). By making similar
arguments, we conclude that qps is given by (34).
Step 5: Showing that any production schedule (qb,qp, rp) that solves SY STEM can be obtained using bids
(γb,γp) and the latter satisfy the characterizations in steps 1 to 3. By Theorem 1, (qb,qp) is the unique solution to
ED(d1) and rps is the unique solution to FR(q
b,qp,ds). Under bids (γb,γp), the problems ED(d1) and ˆED(d1)
are equivalent. Hence, (qb,qp) is the unique solution to ˆED, and by step 4, the production in the first time period
is (qb,qp). Under bids (γb,γp), the problems FR(qb,qp,ds) and ˆFR(qb,qp,ds) are equivalent. Hence, rps is the
unique solution to ˆFR(qb,qp,ds), and by step 4, the recourse production is rps . Hence, the production schedule is
(qb,qp, rp).
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It suffices to show that bids (γb,γp) constitute an equilibrium. It is easy to check that αp = γp and αb = γb
satisfy conditions (25) and (28) respectively for any prices (pib,pip). Hence, simply choose (pib,pip) based on
equations (31) and (32). This proves part (a) of the proposition.
Step 6: Showing that any bids (αb,αp) that satisfy the characterizations in steps 1 to 3 give the same dis-
patch as that under bids (γb,γp). Suppose that (αb,αp) satisfy the characterizations in step 4 with productions
(qb,qp1, . . . ,q
p
S), Lagrange multipliers (
¯
ξ, ξ¯,
¯
ν, ν¯,
¯
µ, µ¯,λ), and prices (pib,pip). We will construct
¯
ξ′, ξ¯′ ∈ RN+ and
¯
ν′1, ν¯
′
1 ∈ RN+ such that: (
Kcb′n (q
b
n), n ∈ N
)
+ ξ¯′ −
¯
ξ′ −Kpib = 0; (35a)
Lb(qb,
¯
ξ′, ξ¯′) = 0; (35b)(
Kcp′n (q
p
1,n), n ∈ N
)
+ ν¯′1 − ¯ν
′
1 −Kpip1 = 0; (35c)
Lp(qp1, ¯
ν′1, ν¯
′
1) = 0, (35d)
and
¯
ν′s, ν¯
′
s ∈ RN+ for all s ∈ S \ {1} such that:(
cp′n (q
p
s,n), n ∈ N
)
+ ν¯′s − ¯ν
′
s − pips = 0; (36a)
Lp(qps , ¯
ν′s, ν¯
′
s) = 0, (36b)
which are the KKT conditions for (29) and (30) under bids (γb,γp). Then, step 5 allows us to infer that the
production schedule is an optimal solution to SY STEM . Our construction is given by:
¯
ξ′n =
K
(
cb′n (
¯
qbn)− pibn
)
, if qbn =
¯
qbn;
0, else,
ξ¯′n =
K
(
pibn − cb′n (q¯bn)
)
, if qbn = q¯
b
n;
0, else,
¯
ν′1,n =
K
(
cp′n (
¯
qpn)− pip1,n
)
, if qp1,n =
¯
qpn;
0, else,
ν¯′1,n =
K
(
pip1,n − cp′n (q¯pn)
)
, if qp1,n = q¯
p
n;
0, else,
and:
¯
ν′s,n =
c
p′
n (
¯
qpn)− pips,n, if qps,n =
¯
qpn;
0, else,
ν¯′s,n =
pi
p
s,n − cp′n (q¯pn), if qps,n = q¯pn;
0, else,
for all s ∈ S \ {1}.
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First, we show that
¯
ξ′, ξ¯′,
¯
ν′s, ν¯
′
s ≥ 0. Suppose qbn =
¯
qbn. Then, from (28a), we infer that c
b′−1
n (pi
b
n) ≤
¯
qbn, and
since cbn is strictly convex, we infer that pi
b
n ≤ cb′n (
¯
qbn), and hence
¯
ξ′n ≥ 0. Suppose qbn = q¯bn. Then, from (28c),
we infer that cb′−1n (pi
b
n) ≥ q¯bn, and since cbn is strictly convex, we infer that pibn ≥ cb′n (q¯bn), and hence ξ¯′n ≥ 0. By
similar arguments, we infer that
¯
ν′s,n ≥ 0 and ν¯′s,n ≥ 0.
Second, we show that this construction satisfies (35) and (36). It is easy to check that the complementary slackness
conditions (35b), (35d), (36b) are satisfied. Suppose
¯
qbn < c
b′−1
n (pi
b
n) < q¯
b
n. From (28b), we infer that α
b
n = γ
b
n. From
the fact that qbn =
[
αbns
b
n(pi
b
n)
]q¯bn
¯
qbn
= cb′−1n (pi
b
n), we infer that
¯
qbn < q
b
n < q¯
b
n. From (31b), we infer that
¯
ξn = ξ¯n = 0.
Substituting into (31a), we infer that our construction satisfies (35a). Suppose cb′−1n (pi
b
n) ≤
¯
qbn. From (28a), we infer
that qbn =
¯
qbn. Hence, our construction satisfies (35a). Suppose q¯
b
n ≤ cb′−1n (pibn). From (28c), we infer that qbn = q¯bn.
Hence, our construction satisfies (35a). Using similar arguments, we can infer that our construction satisfies (35c)
and (36a). This proves part (b) of the proposition.
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